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in obtaining support if the husband remarries, since the second wife would be in a
better position to get at the husband's assets.
Apart from the formal adequacy of the wife's legal remedies, the injunction may
nevertheless be necessary to protect the interest of the state in the marriage relationship.'9 Although New York courts would not give full faith and credit to the Florida
decree, the validity of the decree in New York may never be litigated, for a wife who
asks for an injunction may not be willing to bring a declaratory judgment action. In
that case, the foreign decree would in effect dissolve the marriage. By deterring the
husband from procuring the out-of-state divorce, the injunction serves to prevent the
state's interest from so being circumvented. 2 0 This consideration should be of paramount importance in New York where the underlying domestic relations policy has
been a strict enforcement of marital status, as evidenced by strict divorce laws and
refusal to give full faith and credit to "Reno" divorces. Denial of an injunction in the
present case stands in marked contrast to this policy.

Federal Jurisdiction-Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins---"Federal Field" Doctrine[Federal].-In a suit by an employee against an interstate railroad for back pay, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the cause of action was based upon the collective agreement between the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and the railroad,
rather than upon the oral contract of employment between the plaintiff employee and
the defendant; and that therefore the six-year state statute of limitations was applicable.' Following the remand of the case for trial, plaintiff amended his pleadings
so that an amount of more than $3000 was involved, whereupon defendant secured a
removal to a federal court. The federal district court, holding itself bound under
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins2 by the state court decision as to the foundation of the cause
of action, rendered judgment for the plaintiff.s Upon appeal to the circuit court of
appeals, held, the Congressional statute regulating some aspects of interstate railroad
labor relations should be considered as making the entire matter a "federal field."
Consequently even though there was no federal statute applicable to the particular
situation, the federal court was not bound to follow the state court decision, but was
free to make an independent determination. The cause of action was based upon the
oral contract, and the three-year state statute of limitations should have been applied.
Reversed and remanded.4 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Moore.S
'9

x Beale, Conflict of Laws 502-3 (1935).

in Baumann v. Baumann, 25o N.Y. 382, 165 N.E. 89 (r929), and Lowe v.
Lowe, 265 N.Y. 197, 192 N.E. 291 (1934), the courts have shown an unwillingness to use the
injunction to prevent adultery, or to stop an adulteress from acting as if she were the wife of a
husband who had obtained a foreign divorce.
IMoore v. Illinois Central R. Co., I8o Miss. 276, 176 So. 593 (1937).
2 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3 Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 24 F. Supp. 731 (Miss. 1938).
4 The remand was for the purpose of giving the plaintiff an opportunity to produce additional documents to show that the contract of employment between himself and the defendant
was a written contract.
S I12 F. (2d) 959 (C.C.A. 5 th i940).
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In view of the large number of fields of activity which are partially regulated by
federal statutes, 6 this first application of the "federal field" doctrine7 since the Brie
case8 brings to light an almost forgotten means of attaining much of that uniformity
of regulation which has thus far been denied by the Erie case. Because of the close
relationship of the subject matter of the instant litigation to matters actually covered
by the federal statute, 9 it is true that the present case represents no great restriction
on the operation of the Erie doctrine.o° The significance of the case, however, lies
not only in that it is the first revival of the "federal field" notion since the Erie case, but
also in that it operates to attain uniformity in a much more direct manner than did
previous cases applying the doctrine. Formerly, the "federal field" doctrine was applied
only in instances where, after denying the applicability of a state statute" or de6 Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 Stat. 973 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 4oi-81 (Supp. 1939); Food,
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-92 (Supp. 1939); Communications Act, 5o Stat. 56 (1937), 47 U.S.C.A. § 318 (Supp. 1939), 5o Stat. 189 (937),
47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151, 153, 154, 303, 321, 322, 329, 351-62, 402, 504, 602 (Supp. 1939); Motor
Carriers Act, 49 Stat. 543 (1935), i5 U.S.C.A. § 77c, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-27 (Supp. 1939);
Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 Stat. 159 (1939), 7 U.S.C.A. §§ I81-83, 191-95, 201-3, 20517, 221-29 (1921); Tobacco Control Act, 49 Stat. 1239 (1936), 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 55-I5K (1939).
7 The "federal field" doctrine, which excludes state legislation only after Congress has occupied the field, is to be distinguished from the doctrine of exclusive federal powers, which, even
in the absence of any federal statute, precludes any state legislation in a matter of national importance requiring uniform control. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. (U.S.) 299 (i85i);

Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. ioo (i89o). See Bilk6, The Silence of Congress, 41 Harv. L. Rev.
200 (1927).
8But cf. Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (apportionment of use of
waters of an interstate stream as between two states, a federal question), and Board of Com'rs
of Jackson County v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939) (taxation of an Indian's land by
state, a federal question). The cases are like the "federal field" cases, in that the decisions do
not rest upon statute. They are unlike the "federal field" cases, however, in that the matters in
litigation have long been considered "federal questions" in themselves.
A short time after the instant case was decided, another circuit court rendered a decision
similarly based on the "federal field" doctrine. O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., x13 F. (2d)

539 (C.C.A. ist 194o), noted in 54 Harv. L. Rev. 141 (i94o). It was held that since Congress has

occupied the field of interstate communications, by enacting the Communications Act, the liability of a telegraph company in transmitting a defamatory message in interstate commerce is
not to be determined under state law, but under the "federal common law."
9 The Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1i86 (i934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., regulates the unionization of railroad employees and provides for the settlement of labor disputes before a National Railroad Adjustment Board. In O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F. (2d) 539, 541
(C.C.A. ist i94o) it was expressly stated that there was no federal statute on the particular
question.
oWhile it has been stated that the Erie case was not intended to affect the "federal field"
doctrine, McCormick and Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal Courts,
33 Ill. L. Rev. 126, 142-44 (1938), it is not necessary to consider that question here. It is surlident for the purpose of this note to maintain that to the extent that the "federal field" doctrine is operative, the Erie doctrine must be inoperative.
" Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913); New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (i917); Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Warren-Godwin Lumber Co., 251
U.S. 27 (i919); Missouri P.R. Co. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341 (1927).
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cision"2 it was possible to decide the case on well-established federal common law
principles. The decision of the court in each particular case did not contribute to the
development of a uniform law; it operated only to prohibit a state rule from marring
an already existing uniformity. In the instant case, however, there existed no general
rule as to whether the cause of action was based upon an oral or a written contract;
the decision, therefore, is an initial step toward uniformity.
The mere fact that the "federal field" doctrine operates to attain that uniformity
which is denied by the Erie case does not mean, however, that the present decision is
inconsistent with the Erie doctrine. The Erie case may be viewed as being primarily
a means of effecting a dearer separation between state and national functions, with
the prevention of uniformity on certain matters as but a necessary incident to the
attainment of this greater aim. The Erie case itself, by denying to federal courts the
power to apply federal rules of law in state matters, was a step in this separation
process. A recent unanimous Supreme Court case carries the process still further:
where the state court has not yet "settled" the law on a "local" matter, the federal
courts cannot even hear the case, but must send it to the state court for decision.13
The revival of the "federal field" doctrine in the instant case, it would seem, is entirely consistent with this development; it may well be expected that insistence upon
the application of state law in state matters, unhampered by federal courts, would be
accompanied by a desire that the regulation of federal matters be not hampered by
state rules.
It may be objected, however, that the "federal field" doctrine, as applied in the
present case, and as it would have to be applied in order for it to become of any great
significance, requires a degree of "judicial legislation" which will not be looked upon
with favor. The federal court must decide in the first instance whether the statute is
broad enough that it may be said to have "occupied" the field; and, having affirmatively determined that question, the court, unguided by statute, must promulgate a
rule to apply to the particular case. The departure from the statute in this instance
is to be contrasted with the practice of the courts in determining, for purposes of removal, the analogous question of whether a "federal question" exists. For this latter
purpose, Congressional action does not furnish the basis for the application of federal
law, unless the construction of the statute itself is in issue.14 Furthermore, Supreme
Court expressions of dislike for judicial legislation have of recent years become increasingly insistent;1s and those justices who have been most active in the develop(i916); Hall v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
148, 191 Pac.
573 (191o). See The Applicability of Federal Rules of Decision in State Courts in Suits for
Injuries to Interstate Rail Passengers, 3o Ill. L. Rev. 373, 376 (1935).
'3 Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (i94o), noted in 7 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 727 (i94o). But cf. De Long v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., io9 F. (ed) 585 (C.C.A.
5 th i94o); Samuels v. Quartin, xo8 F. (2d) 789 (C.C.A. 2d 194o).
'4 Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 1o9 (1936); First Nat'l Bank v. Williams,
252 U.S. 504 (1920); Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 487 (19,7); Myrtle v. Nevada, C. & O.R.
Co., 137 Fed. 193 (C.C. Nev. I9o5).
5See dissents of Justice Black in Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316 (1937), and
Gwin v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 442 (1938); and the dissent of justices Black, Frankfurter,
and Douglas in McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176 (I94O).
12

Southern Express Co. v. Byers,
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xo8 S.C. 502, 94 S.E. 870 (i918); Nichols v. Western Union Tel. Co., 44 Nev.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
ment of the Erie doctrine as a means of separating state and national functions 6 have
also been most insistent that national regulations be made by Congress alone.
An additional problem is whether, after a decision such as the one in the present
case, state courts will hereafter be required to apply the rule laid down by the federal
court, just as state courts would be required to apply a federal statute. Instances,
before the Erie case, in which state courts were required to apply a well-established
federal court rule in preference to a state rule,17 indicate that the state courts will be
required to apply the rule of the federal decision.
There appears to be no direct authority on the analogous problem of whether, following a federal court statement that a particular statute is an occupation of the
field, all questions within that field become "federal questions" over which federal
courts have original jurisdiction. It is clear that the court in the instant case, having
acquired jurisdiction by diversity of citizenship, found authority for applying a federal
rule by giving an extended application to the federal statute. It might therefore be
argued that the same extended effect should be given to that statute for the purpose of
determining jurisdiction. This result could not be reached, however, without changing
the practice of refusing to accept removal from a state court unless the construction of
the statute is in issue. 8
Finally, it may be questioned why the court in the present case, having independently determined that the cause of action was based upon the oral contract,
proceeded to apply the state statute of limitations. It is true that where a cause of
action arises directly under a federal statute which contains no period of limitation,
state statutes of limitations are applied.19 The reasoning in those cases, however, is
that the Congress, by failing to set up a period of limitations, manifested an intention
that the state statute should apply. In the instant case, Congress had not even set up
the cause of action; and the same considerations which enable the court to say that
the cause of action is a federal matter would seem also to dictate that there be a uniform statute of limitations. The failure of the court in the instant case to promulgate
a definite period of limitations is probably explained on the ground that the universally
statutory nature of definite periods of limitation causes the matter to be viewed as
being entirely beyond the scope of the judicial function.

Insurance-Incontestability Clause-Age Adjustment Not a Contest within Statutory Incontestability Clause-[Federal].-An insurance policy, containing an incontestability clause was issued by the defendant upon the life of the insured. There was
a specific exception as to age adjustment in the incontestability clause itself. Upon
the death of the insured it was discovered for the first time that he had misstated his
age. The defendant paid the amount due under the age adjustment clause' of the
x6See Barnett, Mr. Justice Black and the Supreme Court, 8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 20, 31-32
(1940).
'7 See note 12 supra.
,8 See note 14 supra.
'9 Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (i9o6).
I "Age.-If the age of the insured has been misstated, any amount payable under any of the
provisions of this contract, shall be that amount which the premium charged would have
purchased for the insured's correct age."

